Günlük arşivler: 3 Temmuz 2014

DİN & DİYANET DOSYASI : KATOLİK KİLİSESİNİN KURTULUŞ ÖGRETİSİ AÇISINDAN YAHUDİLİĞE V E İSLAM’A BAKIŞI


KATOLK KLSESNN KURTULU GRETS AISINDAN YAHUDLE VE SLAM’A BAKII.pdf

TARİH : ESKİ POLONYA’DA KAZAK SAVAŞLARI


ESK POLONYA’DA KAZAK SAVALARI.pdf

ARAŞTIRMA DOSYASI /// HÜSEYİN MÜMTAZ : EZBER BOZMAK (4) – TÜRK “AYDINI”NIN AKÇURA’DAN HABERİ VAR MI ?


ulucami-akhisar-4

Dahilî ve haricî Neocon’ların; bu arada Kaddafi’nin, Saddam’ın , Esat’ın ve İngilizlerin Akçura’yı okumadıklarını, yahut okuyup da anlamadıklarını veya işlerine geldiği gibi anladıklarını

gördük..

“Osmanlı coğrafyası”nı elde tutmak, bir araya getirmek yahut “adı şimdi değiştirilen” aynı bölgede etkili olmak için 1904’de “sınıfta kalan” “ÜÇ TARZ-I SİYASET”in ilk iki ayağı, yâni “Amerikan tarzı Osmanlıcılık” ve “İngiliz güdümünde İslâmcılık”ın 2014’de de uygulanabilirliğinin olmadığı anlaşılıyor.

Sıra geldi “ÜÇÜNCÜ SİYASET” olan Türkçülük’e.

Türkçülük yapısı gereği, ilk iki örnekte olduğu gibi “bir başkası” tarafından kullanılması mümkün olmayan özellikler içeriyor.

Yoksa mümkün mü?

O halde bu yazıdaki kilit kavram “Türk aydını” olacaktır.

Türk aydını kendi varlığının bilincindeyse, gücünün farkındaysa kendisini “kullandırmayacak”, kaderine sahip çıkacaktır.

Türk aydını bunu başarabilmek için önce Akçura’yı iyi bir okumalı, hemen ardından tarihi ve coğrafyasıyla ve nihayet kendisiyle hesaplaşmalıdır.

O halde önce “aydın”, sonra Türk “aydını”, ancak ondan sonra “Türkçülük”..

“Aydın” ve “elit” son yıllarda sanki eşanlamlı imiş gibi kullanılmaya başlandı..

Arkadan “entel”, tepkisel olarak “entel-dantel” geldi.

Paradigmayı tamamlasın diye ben “dantellektüel”i kullanacağım..

“Elit”, toplumun çoğunluğundan kopuk ve toplumun kaygılarından bîhaberdir.

Entel (ektüel) ise “elit”den de rafineymiş görüntüsü verir.

Bizde aydın kendini “entelektüel” olacağım diye “elit” görür. Toplumla neden ilgilensin, çünkü o “uluslararası”dır.

Biri bana “ulusal-milliyetçi” olunmadan nasıl “uluslararası-milletlererası” olunabileceğini anlatabilir mi lütfen?

“Aydın” biraz huysuz, çokça muhalif olacaktır kabul..

Aykırı olmazsa, olağan-durağan olur, bu da gelişmeyi, yeniliklere açık olmayı, çağdaşlığı engeller.

Aydın hep iyiyi, güzeli, doğruyu arayacaktır.

İşte tehlike de burada… Bunu yaparken, yeni öğretilere ve kültürlere açık olurken kendi kültürünün temel özelliklerinden uzaklaşacak mıdır?

Yeri geldi, manzara koyalım..

Japonya’nın kimse “geri” olduğunu iddia edebilir mi? İkinci Savaş mağlubu Japonya sanayide, teknolojide, elektronik ve otomotivde dünya devi..

Önceki yıllarda 9 şiddetinde deprem, sonra tsunami arkadan nükleer bir felaketle yüz yüze kaldı.

Japonya yıkıldı…

Milyonlarca Japon evsiz, elektriksiz, susuz.. Yüzlerce ölü, kayıp, binlerce yaralı..

“Çağdaş” Japonya ve Japonlar, yüzyıllarından ötesinden taşına gelen kültür ve geleneklerine bağlılıklarıyla dünyaya ders verdiler.

Hiçbir televizyon ekranında ağlayan, sızlayanı bırakın…. yağma yapan Japon, yağmalanan dükkan-ev-market gördünüz mü?

Çünkü ferdin önce diğer Japon’a, sonra kurumlarına ve devletine saygısı var.

Hâlbuki 99 depreminde Yalova-Kocaeli-İstanbul’a “bazı” bölgelerden otobüslerle “talan” seferi düzenlendiğini, yağma görüntülerinin ekranları kapladığını hatırlıyorsunuz, değil mi?

Alibeyköy Deresi taşıp da izinsiz-imarsız gecekonduları su basınca gecekondu ahalisinin çıkıp “Nerde bu devlet?” diye bağırışlarını, televizyon-radyo muhabirlerini tekmelemelerini unuttunuz mu? Demek ki “aydın” yeni öğretilere ve kültürlere açık olurken aynı zamanda da kendi kültürünün temel özelliklerinden uzaklaşmayacak bir çizgiyi doğru koyamazsa toplumundan kopuk, ayakları yere basmayan, köksüz bir nilüfer çiçeği, bir “elit” haline gelir.

Aydın’ı böyle olan toplum; topluluk-güruh haline gelmez mi?

Peki “demokrat” ve “aydın” olmak ille “solcu” olmayı mı gerektirir? “Türk/çü aydın” olunamaz mı?

“Türkçü”, demokrat olamaz mı?

Demokratlığın ölçüsü azlık-azınlık-azınlıkçı olmak mıdır?

Aydın, muhalif, aykırı ve huysuz olmak ille “öteki”, yabancı olmak mıdır?

Azlık olmak, azınlıkta hissetmek midir kendini, azınlık olmak mıdır?

Bireysel aidiyetinin köklerini-kültürel birikimini “çoğunlukta” bularak, kendini çoğunluğa ait hissederek aydın olunamaz mı?

Ezilenin-sömürülenin yanında olmak başka ve yüce bir duygudur ama ille kendini onunla özdeşleştirmek de “bizatihi” ezik olma sonucunu doğurmaz mı?

Bambaşka bir yerin nüfusuna kayıtlı olarak “dünyevi mecburiyetler tahtında” yerleştiğiniz Artvin’de Artvinli, Hatay’da Hataylı, Kars’ta Karslı, Diyarbakır’da Diyarbakırlı, Muğla’da Muğlalı, Balıkesir’de Balıkesirli olmak iyidir, hiçbir diyeceğimiz olamaz. Doğan empati, uyumu ve dayanışmayı ve birlikte yaşamayı kolaylaştıracak bir tür sinerji yaratır da Artvin’de Gürcü, Hatay’da Arap, Diyarbakır’da peşmerge, Ege’de Rum hissetmek kendini, “bir tür mahalle baskısına” boyun eğmektir.

Algılama ve aidiyet duygusu muhataralı olanlar için konuyu biraz daha açalım..

Hatay Türk devletinin, Hataylı da Türk milletinin elbette bölünmez parçasıdır.

Tıpkı doğu ve güneydoğu gibi..

Öte yandan Hatay, Suriye’nin (Arapların) “Megali idea”sının da en önemli parçasıdır.

Doğu ve Güneydoğu da, güney sınırımızın dışındaki Kürtlerin.

İşte meseleye bu açıdan bakınca bir başka yerli olarak, misafir bulunduğunuz-iş/görev yaptığınız Hatay’da Hataylı olmayı, bireyin kendisini Hataylılardan farklı görmemesini anlarım ve makul karşılarıma ama Hatay’da Arap kültürü ve ideolojisinin esiri olmayı anlayamam.

Doğu ve güney doğuda da önce ve ille Kürt olunacak diye bir mecburiyet yoktur.

Akıllı okuyucu burada neden bilhassa “Megali idea” kavramını kullandığımı, zihninden örnekleme yaparak ufkunu kendiliğinden genişletebilecektir.

Hani muhaliftiniz siz?

Neden “sınır ötesi” herhangi bir komşunun dış kaynaklı dayatmalarına boyun eğiyorsunuz?

Hani “aykırı” idiniz siz?

Solcu ve demokrat olmak ille azlık, azınlık, azınlıkçı olmak mıdır?

Türk’ün akıl ve duygu sınırları Türkçe’nin sınırlarıdır.

Neredeyse 100 yıl önce Ziya Gökalp;

“VATAN NE TÜRKİYE’DİR TÜRKLERE, NE TÜRKİSTAN;
VATAN BÜYÜK VE MÜEBBET BİR ÜLKEDİR, TURAN” derken;

Putin dün; “Nerede Rus soydaşımız varsa sonuna kadar arkasında olacağız. Bunun için diplomasiyle ekonomi yanı sıra savunma hakkımızı da kullanacağız” demektedir.

http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/26722036.asp

Biz niye düşünemiyoruz, hissedemiyoruz, diyemiyoruz?

“Kerkük bir Kürt şehridir” diyen Barzani’ye hiç kimse neden sormuyor; “Abdülvahit Kuzecioğlu’nun KERKÜK DİVANI’nı, çek/yat mı sandın da bir yerlerine sığdırmaya çalışıyorsun?” diye?

Kerkük’ü verirsen, Diyarbakır’ı nasıl savunacaksın?

Misak-ı Milli sınırlarını savunmanın yolunun, Karabağ, Kerkük/Musul, Kıbrıs, Karasu/Mesta’dan geçtiğini öğrenmemiz için daha nerelerden vaz geçmemiz lâzım?

Akhisar Ulu Cami’ye hiç gittiniz mi?

İnsanlık tarihinin en eski eserlerinden birisidir. İncil’de de adı geçer. Kitabesinde yapılış tarihi “milattan önce” diye yazan Ulu Cami 1311 yılında Saruhan beyliğinin Akhisar’ı fethetmesi ile beraber tam 700 yıldır cami görevini yerine getirmektedir.

Ulu Cami paganlara, Hıristiyanlara, Müslümanlara ve kuvvetle muhtemel, M.Ö. 550 yıllarında buraları işgal eden Perslerin inancı olan ateşe tapınmaya da ev sahipliği yapmıştır.
Yâni tarih boyunca 4 inanca şahit olmuştur.

Ama şimdi….camiye girince başınızı yukarı, kubbeye kaldırın.. 16 (Onaltı) Ay-Yıldız göreceksiniz..

Mihrap’ın en üstünde de yine görkemli bir Ay-Yıldız vardır.

Türkiye içinde Türk bayrağı indirilirken, “Türk’ün akıl ve duygu sınırları Türkçe’nin sınırlarıdır” dememiz şaka gibi gelebilir ama ne çare ki Akhisar Ulu Cami’de Ay ve Yıldız hâlâ duruyor.

Ne dersiniz? Cumhurbaşkanlığı Forsu’nda ve o kubbede bulunan 16 Ay ve Yıldız’ın; içinde bulunduğumuz Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçim sürecinden sonra kaldırılma-değişme ihtimali var mıdır?

Ağzımdan yel alsın..

Türkçülerin ve muhafazakârların hem demokrat hem aydın hem de liberal olamayacağını kim söylüyor?

Atilla İlhan mı?

Hadi canım siz de..

Konu hem Türkçülük, hem Osmanlıcılık, hem solculuk, hem de bilinçli aydın olmak olunca Atilla İlhan’sız bir yazı noksan olur..

Gelecek yazının konusu da bu olur.. 1 Temmuz 2014

57’İNCİ ALAY HER YERDE
HEPİMİZ 57’İNCİ ALAYIN NEFERİYİZ

TWITTER MUHABBETLERİ : İlginç tweet Sosyal Medyayı Kırdı Geçirdi :))


The Military Is Already Using Facebook to Track Your Mood


Critics have targeted a recent study on how emotions spread on the popular social network site Facebook, complaining that some 600,000 Facebook users did not know that they were taking part in an experiment. Somewhat more disturbing, the researchers deliberately manipulated users’ feelings to measure an effect called emotional contagion.

Patrick Tucker is technology editor for Defense One. He’s also the author of The Naked Future: What Happens in a World That Anticipates Your Every Move? (Current, 2014). Previously, Tucker was deputy editor for The Futurist, where he served for nine years. Tucker’s writing on emerging technology … Full Bio

Though Cornell University, home to at least one of the researchers, said the study received no external funding, but it turns out that the university is currently receiving Defense Department money for some extremely similar-sounding research — the analysis of social network posts for “sentiment,” i.e. how people are feeling, in the hopes of identifying social “tipping points.”

The tipping points in question include “the 2011 Egyptian revolution, the 2011 Russian Duma elections, the 2012 Nigerian fuel subsidy crisis and the 2013 Gazi park protests in Turkey,” according to the website of the Minerva Initiative, a Defense Department social science project.

It’s the sort of work that the U.S. military has been funding for years, most famously via the open-source indicators program, an Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) program that looked at Twitter to predict social unrest.

If the idea of the government monitoring and even manipulating you on Facebook gives you a cold, creeping feeling, the bad news is that you can expect the intelligence community to spend a great deal more time and money researching sentiment and relationships via social networks like Facebook. In fact, defense contractors and high-level U.S. intelligence officials say that social network data has become one of the most important tools they use in the collecting intelligence.

Defense One recently caught up with Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency who said the U.S. military has “completely revamped” the way it collects intelligence around the existence of large, openly available data sources and especially social media like Facebook. “The information that we’re able to extract form social media — it’s giving us insights that frankly we never had before,” he said.

In other words, the head of one of the biggest U.S. military intelligence agencies needs you on Facebook.

“Just over a decade ago, when I was a senior intelligence officer, I spent most of my time in the world of ‘ints’ — signals intelligence imagery, human intelligence — and used just a little bit of open-source information to enrich the assessments that we made. Fast forward to 2014 and the explosion of the information environment in just the last few years alone. Open-source now is a place I spend most of my time. The open world of information provides us most of what we need and the ‘ints’ of old, they enrich the assessments that we’re able to make from open-source information.”

Open-source intelligence can take a variety of forms, but among the most voluminous, personal and useful is Facebook and Twitter data. The availability of that sort of information is changing the way that DIA trains intelligence operatives. Long gone are the spooks of old who would fish through trash for clues on targets. Here to stay are the eyes looking through your vacation pictures.

“We train them differently even than we did a year ago because of the types of tools we have. There are adjustments to the trade craft, and that’s due to the amount of information we can now get our hands on,” Flynn said.

The growth of social media has not just changed day-to-day life at agencies like DIA, it’s also given rise to a mini gold rush in defense contracting. The military will be spending an increasing amount of the $50 billion intelligence budget on private contractors to perform open-source intelligence gathering and analysis, according to Flynn. That’s evidenced by the rise in companies eager to provide those services.

Some of them are well known like Palantir, the Silicon Valley data visualization giant that’s been featured prominently in Bloomberg Businessweek and has graced the cover of Forbes. Collecting or analyzing social network data wasn’t something they originally wanted to get into according to Bryant Chung, a Palantir employee. Palantir doesn’t market itself as a data collection company. They provide a tool set to help agencies visualize and share data.

The company worried that partnering with the intelligence community to do social network data collection could hurt their reputation among the tech community, increasingly wary of the government, according to Chung. When the company was approached by NATO and some U.S. intelligence groups, they decided to explore the marketplace for sentiment analysis of social network data.

“There are a lot of other commercial companies already in that space. Unless we know we’re going to crush it, we don’t want to get in,” Chung said. “I think we have a differentiated capability, especially at a macro level. For example, you are interested in monitoring an election somewhere in Africa and you want to know who are the people tweeting on one side of an election versus the other, or who are the most influential tweeters or you what if you have intelligence that an explosion is about to happen at a particular square, can you confirm that using Tweets?” That’s the sort of thing Palantir wants to help you with.

Many of the groups doing this sort of work on behalf of the government are small outfits you probably have never heard of. And ideally, you never would.

One of them is a company out of Austin, Texas, called SnapTrends, founded in 2012. They provide a “social listening” service that analyzes posts to provide insights about the circumstances of the poster, one of the most important of which is the poster’s location. The company uses cell tower density, social network knowhow, and various other elements to figure out who is posting what and where. Are you someone who refuses to geo-tag your tweets out of concerns for privacy? Do you turn off your phone’s GPS receiving capability to stay under the proverbial radar? It doesn’t matter to SnapTrends.

One tweet and they can find you.

“If it’s a dense environment. I can put you within a block. If it’s a [bad] environment I can put you within two or three blocks,” said Todd Robinson, director of operations for Defense Military Intelligence for the company General Dynamics Information Technology, GDIT, and SnapTrends president for Middle Eastern operations. GDIT partnered with SnapTrends to sell their services to the government. “Once I do have you, I click this button right here, I can go back five years [of social media posts.]”

SnapTrends says that the tool was extremely helpful in the investigation following the 2013 Boston Marathon bomb attacks. Using social network analysis, “we found the college kids that had access to the computers [owned by the suspects]. We were able to get to them first,” said Robins.

The use of social network data for intelligence isn’t just fair, Robbins says, it’s a no-brainer. Scrawling Facebook for clues about human behavior doesn’t require breaking in via backdoors or other elaborate pieces of technological trickery. “When you join Twitter and Facebook, you sign an agreement saying you will post that to a public web page. We just pull data from that web page.”

”I’m a retired intelligence guy,” he said. “This is not that difficult, people.”

But while social data may be an important tool in intelligence collection, it’s hardly a permanent one.

In the same way that observing the behavior of some subatomic particles changes the behavior of those particles (called the observer effect), watching the tweets and posts of targets can create an environment where people tweet less. You poison your own well by drawing from it. That happens on an individual level in terms of specific human targets but also on a larger, societal level.

“We’ve seen that already,” Robinson said. “There is always a risk that as people understand this, they’ll quit putting [posts] on there.”

The view was seconded by SnapTrends co-founder and CEO, Eric Klasson. “The more the ‘bad guys’ know about what is possible, the less they will use social media. This undermines state, local, federal and international law enforcement efforts,” he told Defense One.

When asked if he was concerned that people might stop using Facebook, Twitter and other social networks as a result of U.S. intelligence activities, Flynn answered matter-of-factly: “Yes.”

“We have to be agile enough to watch how those adaptations occur and we have to try to stay ahead of them for when we see them and adjust our capabilities to be able to understand them. People will constantly adapt to their environment in order to survive,” he said.

DIA has some time before the social network pool is spoiled. Today, Facebook remains the number one social network in the Middle East. More than 90 percent of all the Internet users of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates use the service.

Should millions of people decide to abandon the network and seek out another one to connect to and communicate with the outside world, the U.S. intelligence community will likely already be there.

SURVEILLANCE /// VİDEO : ISIS The Start of World War III ? – David Icke


VİDEO LİNK :

RESEARCH DOCUMENT /// Iran 1953 : US Envoy to Baghdad Suggested to Fleeing Shah He Not Acknowledge Foreign Role in Coup


Shah "Agreed," Declassified Cable Says

Document Casts Doubt over Accuracy of US Reports from Tehran — and Adds to Debate over Responsibility for the Coup

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 477

Posted July 2, 2014

Edited by Malcolm Byrne

For more information contact:
Malcolm Byrne 202/994-7043 or nsarchiv

Washington, DC, July 2, 2014 –On August 16, 1953, the same day the Shah of Iran fled to Baghdad after a failed attempt to oust Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq, the agitated monarch spoke candidly about his unsettling experience to the U.S. ambassador to Iraq. In a highly classified cable to Washington, the ambassador reported: "I found Shah worn from three sleepless nights, puzzled by turn of events, but with no (repeat no) bitterness toward Americans who had urged and planned action. I suggested for his prestige in Iran he never indicate that any foreigner had had a part in recent events. He agreed."

Despite the passage of more than six decades, fundamental questions persist about Mosaddeq’s overthrow, including who was responsible for this milestone event in Iranian history. The above cable, which was previously published but with these key passages excised for secrecy reasons, is one of several important pieces of evidence pointing to the United States role.

Nevertheless, the question of how important the U.S. and British were in the events of 1953 has recently come under intensified scrutiny. An article in the July/August 2014 issue of Foreign Affairs by noted Iran analyst Ray Takeyh is the latest in a series of analyses by respected scholars who conclude Iranians, not the CIA or British intelligence, were fundamentally responsible.

In the course of explaining "What Really Happened in Iran," however, the piece spotlights some of the risks of writing about such sensitive historical events, particularly when they involve covert intelligence operations. In particular — how do you know when to trust your sources?

Today’s brief posting is by no means a full assessment or refutation of this argument. (In the interests of disclosure, the author believes the evidence shows that both the CIA — with British help — and Iranians themselves were critical in their own ways to the end result[1]). Instead, the posting mainly points out one of the peculiar challenges confronting historians of 1953, especially on the question of the U.S. and British roles.

The challenge is simply that U.S. and British reporting about the coup cannot be taken strictly at face value. The main reason is secrecy. President Eisenhower underscored the need for confidentiality in a diary entry from the time. Dated October 8, 1953, but referring back to August 19, Eisenhower notes: "Another recent development that we helped bring about was the restoration of the Shah to power in Iran and the elimination of Mossadegh. The things we did were ‘covert.’ If knowledge of them became public, we would not only be embarrassed in that region, but our chances to do anything of like nature in the future would almost totally disappear." (See Document 1)

Because of that concern, even internal U.S. records (not just those aimed at public audiences, such as Kermit Roosevelt’s memoir, Countercoup) sometimes cast events in a particular light, exaggerated them, or omitted key facts for the sake of protecting the operation.

A case in point is U.S. Ambassador Loy Henderson’s August 20 preliminary report to the State Department on the events surrounding the coup (Document 2), which the Foreign Affairs article cites. Henderson, initially opposed to the coup plan, was eventually read into the program in detail. Yet, he makes no mention whatsoever of the various CIA-planned activities, either in terms of their effectiveness or the lack thereof. Instead, he writes as if there had been no such activities at all.

Why? Because very few officials knew about the plans, including in the State Department, certain quarters of which were still innocently proposing approaches to Mosaddeq after the operation had been put into play. Henderson was not about to jeopardize operational security by divulging secrets in a reporting cable he knew would attract wide attention within the Department. Therefore, even if his expression of surprise at the size of the crowds on August 19 was genuine — and there is reason to believe it was overstated (see Document 2 description below) — it cannot be assumed he was telling the full story as he knew it, much less that he believed the covert operation had been immaterial.

Henderson’s follow-up cable (Document 3) to the Department the next day, August 21, makes this point even more starkly. In it, he coyly reports that "Unfortunately impression becoming rather widespread that in some way or other this Embassy or at least US Government has contributed with funds and technical assistance to overthrow Mosadeq and establish Zahedi Government." Since he knew all about the plans, this could only have been a deliberate attempt to protect the operation from wider disclosure.

The British engaged in the same Orwellian exercise. An example is the British Foreign Office report to the Cabinet shortly after the coup (Document 4). It also makes no mention of the joint clandestine operation, the success or failure of which would have been of high interest to anyone with access to it.

Ann K.S. Lambton, noted British Iran specialist and advocate of Mosaddeq’s ouster. (Photographer unknown)

For a better idea of how some British Iran watchers thought London should act during this period, see Document 5 from two years before the coup. In a conversation with a Foreign Office colleague, the venerable Ann Lambton brusquely spells out her preferences for how to deal with Mosaddeq — i.e. to "under-mine" him using "covert means" in order to "create the sort of climate in Tehran which is necessary to change the regime."

The desire to keep information about the operation hidden has continued long after the fact. It is worth recalling that the single most important compilation of U.S. records about the overthrow — Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume X, "Iran," 1951-1954 — became a symbol of historical manipulation when it was published in 1989 without a single reference to the American or British parts in the operation. (The State Department Historian’s Office expects to produce a "retrospective" volume in Summer 2014, which reportedly will contain CIA and other previously withheld documents that will shed new light on American thinking and activities during the coup period.)

The final document in this posting (Document 6) is an August 17, 1953, cable from the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad reporting on the ambassador’s meeting with the Shah who had just fled Iran that day. Although it deals with events prior to the second coup attempt (which is the focal point for those arguing the case for Iranian responsibility), the cable makes it clear the Shah was fully aware of the importance of the U.S. in recent events (see description below). The document first appeared in the FRUS volume above, but the key portions mentioned here were excised. The unexpurgated document, obtained from files at the National Archives and Records Administration, is presented in this posting.

These examples do not presume to deal with all the arguments made in Foreign Affairs or elsewhere by others with a similar take on the subject. They also certainly do not represent every instance of questionable sourcing that exists on the overthrow. But the documents below do point up a major wrinkle that anyone interested in the 1953 coup must take into account.

THE DOCUMENTS

Document 1: Dwight Eisenhower, Diary entry, October 8, 1953, Secret

Source: Eisenhower Library

The section of this diary entry dealing with Iran sums up President Eisenhower’s understanding of events at the time. In a Weekly Standard piece in 2013 that closely parallels his Foreign Affairs article, Ray Takeyh implies that Eisenhower did not believe Kermit Roosevelt’s account, quoting the diary as saying the CIA agent’s report "seemed more like a dime novel than an historical fact." However, the full passage makes clear the president accepted Roosevelt’s version without reservation, commenting on "exactly how courageous our agent was in staying right on the job [after the first attempt] and continuing to work until he reversed the entire situation."

Document 2: Loy Henderson, Cable #416 to the State Department, August 20, 1953, noon. Confidential

Source: FRUS

This preliminary report on the events of recent days is suspect as a full and accurate record since it avoids any reference to U.S. involvement, even though that fact was well known to Henderson and others at the Embassy. That makes it more difficult to assess the rest of the detailed rundown of events it provides. The summary may well reflect the true beliefs or best information available to the Embassy, but without any sense of the sources used there is reason to be guarded. For one thing, the situation was by most accounts still highly fluid. Even the Americans and British were worried that the Tudeh might mount a serious counter-attack, and showed frustration that Zahedi had not been more effective in forestalling that possibility. Furthermore, it was entirely in line with the goals of the covert operation (regardless of one’s views about its efficacy) to present the events of 28 Mordad in as positive a light as possible, including portraying it as entirely spontaneous and far-reaching.

In that regard, a lingering question requiring further clarification — even after all these years — is what the true size of the crowds was. The scholar Ali Rahnema in a forthcoming book gives a detailed breakdown of the demonstrations on August 19.[2] Among other sources, he notes that even the pro-Zahedi press (Dad) came up with a crowd figure of 7,000. If accurate, that hardly compares to the numbers given for various Tudeh marches (e.g., in July 1952 and 1953), and would not by itself justify characterizing 28 Mordad as a major revolt.

Document 3: Loy Henderson, Cable #436 to the State Department, August 21, 1953, 2:00 p.m. Secret

Source: FRUS

Beyond the opening passage quoted above, this cable is interesting for the arguments it advances in the second paragraph in favor of keeping mum about the question of foreign involvement in the overthrow — even to the point of declining to deny the charge. Prophetically, the author notes that the current government, "like all governments of Iran eventually will become unpopular and at that time US might be blamed for its existence."

Document 4: Foreign Office, Brief for the Cabinet, "Persia," August 25, 1953. Secret

Source: British National Archives

It is hard to know whether the author(s) of this briefing knew about the joint U.S.-British operation. Clearly, the Cabinet was meant to be kept in the dark about it. Much of the analysis in the memo sounds perfectly reasonable in retrospect — a fact that does not at all imply that those in the loop believed their role had been insignificant.

Document 5: E. A. Berthoud, Minute, "Persia," June 15, 1951. Confidential

Source: British National Archives

Ann K.S. (Nancy) Lambton was a renowned scholar of Persian history and culture, well-connected with the British government, and regularly consulted on Iranian politics, especially during the Mosaddeq period. She reportedly had as little respect for the Shah as she did for the prime minister, whom she bluntly advocated overthrowing. Lambton proposes sending a colleague, Robin Zaehner, to Iran to put in place the pieces she sees as necessary to removing Mosaddeq. (Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison did in fact assign Zaehner to help put together a coup plan.) Lambton’s comment that Zaehner "was apparently extremely successful" at advancing British interests through propaganda during the 1945-46 Azerbaijan crisis says a great deal about British assumptions about their power to influence events in Iran.

Document 6: U.S. Embassy Baghdad, Cable #92 to the Under Secretary, August 17, 1953. Top Secret / No Distribution

Source: National Archives and Records Administration

This cable from U.S. Ambassador Burton Y. Berry in Baghdad was classified Top Secret and directed personally to the Under Secretary of State. Given its audience of one, the author feels freer than Henderson evidently did in the above reports to be forthright about such sensitive topics as the Shah’s state of mind and his admissions concerning the U.S. role in the coup to that point. Interestingly, the Shah made several statements to Berry that showed his dependence on the guidance of a person he refers to only as "an American." The cable notes this was "not (repeat not) an official of the State Department," leading to this author’s conclusion it was probably Kermit Roosevelt. The ambassador also makes clear the Shah intends to continue to get "advice from his American friend" before taking any further steps — a small indication that calls into further question the idea that the U.S. role can be entirely dismissed even after the initial failure of the CIA-British plan.

NOTES

[1] For a comprehensive statement of this view, see the Conclusion of Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne (Syracuse, 2004). See also the various previous postings linked at the top of this page.

[2] Ali Rahnema, Behind the 1953 Coup in Iran: Thugs, Turn-Coats, Soldiers, Spies (Cambridge University Press: November 2014).

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